The no-go zone around the plant will likely be in effect for years, if not decades, to come.

November 15, 2011

Goshi ‘I can’t wait for all the animals to die’ Hosono

The important line in this article refers to the issue of how long the no-go zone around the plant be in effect?  Years to decades.  This means that the animals that are now in the no-go zone are doomed to suffering unless the Government of Japan decides to allow the animal rescuers into the Fukushima Exclusion Zone.

However, since Goshi ‘I am just going to allow all the animals to suffer before they die a slow death’ Hosono is still the Minister of Environment and Nuclear Disaster Management, despite is aptitude for incompetency, the Government of Japan will not actively rescue any animals.   Let’s just hope that people start to understand the motivations of this man and do not re-elect him to office.

1st look at Japan nuke plant: rubble amid progress

DAVID GUTTENFELDER, Associated Press, ERIC TALMADGE, Associated Press
Updated 05:49 a.m., Saturday, November 12, 2011

OKUMA, Japan (AP) — Two reactor buildings once painted in a cheery sky blue loom over the Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant. Their roofs are blasted away, their crumbled concrete walls reduced to steel frames.

In their shadow, plumbers, electricians and truck drivers, sometimes numbering in the thousands, go dutifully about their work, all clad from head to toe in white hazmat suits. Their job — cleaning up the worst nuclear disaster since Chernobyl — will take decades to complete.

Reporters, also in radiation suits, visited the ravaged facility Saturday for the first time since Japan’s worst tsunami in centuries swamped the plant March 11, causing reactor explosions and meltdowns and turning hundreds of square miles (kilometers) of countryside into a no man’s land.

Eight months later, the plant remains a shambles. Mangled trucks, flipped over by the power of the wave, still clutter its access roads. Rubble remains strewn where it fell. Pools of water cover parts of the once immaculate campus.

Tens of thousands of the plant’s former neighbors may never be able to go home. And just as Hiroshima and Nagasaki become icons of the horrors of nuclear weapons, Fukushima has become the new rallying cry of the global anti-nuclear energy movement.

Yet this picture is one of progress, Japanese officials say. It has taken this long to make the plant stable enough to allow Saturday’s tour, which included representatives of the Japanese and international media — including The Associated Press. Officials expect to complete an early but important step toward cleaning up the accident by the end of the year.

“I think it’s remarkable that we’ve come this far,” Environment Minister Goshi Hosono, Japan’s chief nuclear crisis response official, said before leading the tour. “The situation at the beginning was extremely severe. At least we can say we have overcome the worst.“

The group was taken through the center of the facility, a once-neat row of reactor buildings that are now shells of shattered walls and steel frames. Journalists were then briefed inside the plant’s emergency operations center, a spacious, bunker-like structure where it is safe to remove the heavy protective gear required outdoors.

Woefully unprepared for the wave that swept over its breakwater, the plant just 140 miles (225 kilometers) northeast of Tokyo was doomed almost from the start.

“During the first week of the accident, I thought several times that we were all going to die,” plant chief Masao Yoshida said.

At the height of the crisis, all but a few dozen workers — dubbed the “Fukushima 50″ — were evacuated. Officials boast that number is now up to as many as 3,000 a day, compared with the pre-crisis work force of 6,400.

Evidence of the tremendous man-hours already invested in the cleanup is piling up in the workers’ staging area, on the edge of the 12-mile (20-kilometer) no-go zone around the plant. More than 480,000 sets of used protective gear — which can be worn only once — lie in crates or plastic bags at the complex, which before the tsunami was a training facility for national-level soccer teams.

Kazuo Okawa, 56, who worked at Fukushima for 20 years, was called back to join an emergency crew for several days in April. His team wore three layers of gloves, full-face masks, double-layer Tyvek protective coveralls, rubber boots with plastic covers and plastic head covers. They carried personal Geiger counters.

“Obviously, it was very dangerous at that time,” he recalled during a recent visit to Tokyo. “Luckily, we got out without experiencing any life-threatening situations.”

Workers like Okawa — in Chernobyl they were called “liquidators” — have restored the plant’s supply of electricity, set up elaborate cooling and drainage systems, rebuilt crumbled walls and erected a huge tent to cover one of the worst-hit reactors, cutting the amount of radioactivity leaking into the surrounding environment.

Tokyo Electric Power Co., which runs the plant, says it will achieve a “cold shutdown” by the end of the year — a first step toward creating a stable enough environment for work to proceed on removing the reactors’ nuclear fuel and closing the plant altogether.

But that is by no means the end of the story.

A preliminary government report released this month predicted it will take 30 years or more to safely decommission Fukushima Dai-ichi. Like Chernobyl, it will probably be encased in a concrete and steel “sarcophagus.”

Hiroaki Koide, a nuclear physicist at Kyoto University, said he doubts the decommissioning process will go as smoothly as the government hopes. He said pools for spent fuel remain highly volatile, and cleaning up the three reactor cores that melted through their innermost chambers will be a massive challenge.

“Nobody knows where exactly the fuel is, or in what condition,” he said. “The reactors will have to be entombed in a sarcophagus, with metal plates inserted underneath to keep it watertight. But within 25 to 30 years, when the cement starts decaying, that will have to be entombed in another layer of cement. It’s just like Russian Matryoshka dolls, one inside the other.”

The no-go zone around the plant will likely be in effect for years, if not decades, to come. Officials reluctantly admit that tens of thousands of evacuated residents may never be able to return home.

Recent studies suggest that Japan continues to significantly underestimate the scale of the disaster — which could have health and safety implications far into the future.

According to a study led by Andreas Stohl the Norwegian Institute for Air Research, twice as much radioactive cesium-137 — a cancer-causing agent — was pumped into the atmosphere than Japan had announced, reaching 40 percent of the total from Chernobyl. The French Institute for Radiological Protection and Nuclear Safety found that 30 times more cesium-137 was released into the Pacific than the plant’s owner has owned up to.

“We have not studied the content of their research, and are not in a position to respond,” saidHiroki Kawamata, a TEPCO spokesman. “We have no plans at this point to modify our estimates.”

Before the crisis, resource-poor Japan relied on nuclear power for about one-third of its electricity. It was planning to boost that share to 50 percent by 2030.

Without nuclear, Japan will have to import more fossil fuels, cutting its potential GDP by 1.2 percent and costing 7.2 trillion yen ($94 billion) annually, according to an estimate by the Japan Center for Economic Research.

But public support for nuclear power — and the trust that the industry is built on — has plummeted.

Tens of thousands of Japanese have turned out in protest. Suspicious of government and TEPCO reassurances, grassroots groups are scouring the country with radiation detectors. Several “hot spots” in and around Tokyo are now being investigated by the authorities.

Because of the outcry, Japan has essentially abandoned its long-term goal of expanding nuclear energy production. The status of even its existing plants is murky.

Currently, 43 of Japan’s 54 nuclear reactors are shut down, either because of mechanical problems or routine inspections, which must be conducted every 13 months. Local approval is required to restart nuclear power plants, even after routine inspections, and local leaders fearing repercussions at the polls have been loath to provide it.

TEPCO announced two weeks ago there will be enough power to see the country through the winter, but after that, the effect of the nuclear crisis on electricity production could become even more acute. If political resistance remains as high as it is now, every nuclear reactor in Japan could be offline by May.

___

Talmadge reported from Hirono. APTN producer Miki Toda, at the plant, and writer Mari Yamaguchi, in Tokyo, contributed to this story.

http://www.chron.com/news/article/1st-look-at-Japan-nuke-plant-rubble-amid-progress-2265490.php#page-1

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Will you buy something made from recycled radioactive materials?

November 9, 2011

The document is from the Government of Japan’s Ministry of Environment.  The Ministry is managed by Goshi Hosono who is also the Minister of Nuclear Disaster Management.  The document describes how debris from the areas affected by the tsunami is to be handled.  It seems pretty clear-cut until you realize that there is no distinction being made between radioactive debris and non-radioactive debris.

From all the news coverage, we would assume that the debris has been exposed to the same radioactive dust as the trees and the soil.  The debris has been sitting out exposed to the same radioactive particles as everything else in that area.  However, when you read the Master Plan for Disaster Waste Management, you notice that there is no mention of what to do with ” radioactive” debris. Nothing about decontamination before recycling the radioactive debris.

The Master Plan just discusses the types of debris and how they should be managed and if the item can be recycled, then according to the Japanese Law about recycling materials, the debris will be recycled.  Again, no distinction between radioactive and non-radioactive debris. When the materials are recycled, and are used again, does this mean that you are purchasing something that has a little bit more ” charge” to it?   One would have to assume that this would be the case.  And, as the Government of Japan and Goshi Hosono has shown, they really don’t care about the people as long as they address the mess that their pals at TEPCO caused.

This also illustrates the hypocrisy of the Government of Japan especially the Minister of Environment and Nuclear Disaster Management, Goshi HOSONO.  He would have all the debris managed according to the Japanese recycling law that was enacted, but did not practice the same when it came to the Animal Welfare law as it would have applied to the Fukushima animals.

The difference for applying the Japanese recycling law and not the Animal Welfare law would be one of profit.  Japan’s Government by recycling would not have to spend as much to dispose the bulk, and those radioactive storage facilities will not have to be so large.  It saves them money.   If they had followed the Animal Welfare Law that should have covered all the animals in the Fukushima Exclusion Zone, the Government of Japan would have spent money.  They actually might have had to hire more than the 5-6 individuals they did hire to try and capture the thousands of animals left in the zone.

It becomes clear that the Government of Japan’s Prime Minister Noda and his Cabinet members as well as the DIET have no problem trying to pass this off on an unwary Japanese citizens.   The Government officials would just make sure that they didn’t purchase anything that they knew were made of recycled materials.  It would be their secret.

By the way, if the Government of Japan officials were really with and for their citizens, they would  not have shipped their families out of the country when the Fukushima nuclear plant was in crisis.  However, from what I understand,  the Governor of Fukushima Prefecture Sato evacuated his family overseas.  I also understand that the employees from TEPCO secretly evacuated their families while the general Fukushima population was not privy to the same information or consideration.  Do you remember how the Government officials had all those people move from a low radioactive area into the shelter that was a higher radioactive area?  I do and I am sure that all those people who were in that shelter remember also.   What ever did happen to the Government people who did that?  Did they get to bow and say they were sorry and that was good enough for the Government?  I bet they even got to keep their jobs and most likely got a promotion.  That’s how the Government of Japan seems to work.

How’s that for a caring government?  It would seem that they practice PRIVILEGE before all else.

http://www.env.go.jp_jishin_attach_haiki_masterplan-en

Guidelines (Master Plan) for Disaster Waste Management after the Great East Japan Earthquake
May 16, 2011

Ministry of the Environment

1. Introduction
・To manage waste resulting from the Great East Japan Earthquake, the government has already taken such actions as issuing the “Guidelines for the Removal of Damaged Houses and Structures after the Tohoku-Pacific Ocean Earthquake,” the “Guidelines for the Disposal of Damaged Houses and Other Structures (Draft Outline),” and other notifications, while urging Iwate, Miyagi and Fukushima Prefectures to set up their own councils on disaster waste management by
bringing together officials of the prefectural government, municipal governments and the central government, as well as representatives of related industries.

・Meanwhile, disaster-related wastes is being gathered at temporary waste storage sites in greater amounts, which means that the government needs to implement measures for the incineration, recycling and final disposal of these wastes on a full scale. With the goal of promoting the appropriate and efficient management of disaster-related wastes, the present Guidelines outline issues such as the roles of each actors, fiscal measures and treatment methods and schedules, with attention mainly to treatment after transportation to temporary storage sites.

・In accordance with the Guidelines, the prefectural governments of the disaster-stricken areas are expected to develop disaster waste management plans that specify concrete treatment methods suited to local conditions and promote appropriate and efficient management of disaster-related waste.
2. Roles of each actors
・The central, prefectural and municipal governments should play the roles described below in principle and cooperate to facilitate appropriate and efficient disaster waste management.

Central government:
The central government should ensure that municipal governments, or prefectural governments where they have
been consigned relevant administrative work from municipal governments under the Local Autonomy Act (hereinafter
collectively referred to as “prefectures/municipalities”), implement disaster wastes management appropriately and
efficiently. To this end, the central government should prepare waste management guidelines (master plan) and
provide assistance aimed at fostering cross-jurisdictional and efficient waste management, including implementing fiscal
measures, dispatching experts and providing information on treatment facilities operated by municipalities or private
businesses outside the prefecture.

Prefectural government:
With regard to the establishment of temporary storage sites and management of disaster-related wastes, the prefectural
government should conduct overall coordination with municipal governments through a disaster waste management council or other framework and develop a disaster waste management plan that stipulates specific treatment methods. This plan should reflect ideas and proposals on treatment methods widely solicited from the public. Where the prefectural government has been consigned relevant administrative work from a devastated municipal government under the Local Autonomy Act, the prefectural government should manage disaster-related wastes on behalf of the municipal government.

Municipal government:
The municipal government should treat disaster-related waste in accordance with the disaster wastes management
plan developed by the prefectural government.
3. Fiscal measures for waste management

(1) Fiscal measures
Considering the severity and extensiveness of the damage caused by the Great East Japan Earthquake, the central government should, as an exception, raise the rate of national subsidies for disaster waste management implemented by prefectures/municipalities in a manner that takes into account the rate of national contribution specified in the Disaster Relief Act. Disaster wastes management expenses that are not covered by state subsidies and are therefore to be borne by
municipal governments should be fully financed by issuing disaster response bonds if the municipality’s estimated disaster waste management costs are excessively high. The full amount of funds to redeem these bonds, including the interest, should be secured by national tax allocation to local governments.

(2) Ensuring efficient execution
Prefectures/municipalities should ensure efficiency in the execution of the budget for disaster waste management by taking into account the following perspectives.

・Ensuring efficient waste management by involving experts in waste treatment methods and technologies in the process of formulating a disaster waste management plan and monitoring its progress.

・Contracting out waste treatment projects in a manner that contributes to local employment as much as possible, while
considering speed and efficiency (adopting a contracting method that ensures competitiveness).

・Setting proper bidding prices by referring to market prices before the earthquake, based on commercially available data on prices.

・For ensuring efficiency, promoting cross-jurisdictional waste treatment by forming a joint treatment structure with
neighboring municipalities. The central government should support the promotion of cross-jurisdictional waste treatment by matching extra capacity in treatment facilities operated by municipalities or private businesses
outside the prefecture and the demand of devastated municipalities.

4. Treatment methods

(1) Treatment policy
・The amount of unsorted waste should be reduced by having waste roughly sorted to the extent possible (e.g., collecting hazardous waste and recyclable waste separately at the source), before being transported to temporary storage sites. Efforts should be made to reduce the total treatment costs and the volume of final disposal by separating, with heavy equipment or in shredding and sorting facilities, mixed wastes gathered at temporary storage sites into different categories—such as combustible waste, noncombustible waste, recyclables and hazardous waste—so that they can be
treated according to their properties.

・The treatment procedure as shown in Appendix 1 should be followed in principle and recyclable materials should be recycled whenever possible.

・To promote recycling, it is essential to keep track of the types of recyclable wastes and their amounts.

・Waste concrete should be reused as materials for reconstruction in devastated areas. Regarding waste wood, the possibility of cross-jurisdictional reuse should be discussed. These types of wastes also require consideration on long-term treatment that takes account of demand for recycled materials (acceptable amounts).

・Items for which the recycling procedure is established (automobiles, televisions, refrigerators, air conditioners, washing machine, etc.), should be recycled as far as sorting is possible and recycling is technically feasible.

・In selecting temporary storage sites and hauling trucks and formulating collection/transportation plans, consideration should be given to the prevention of traffic congestion.

(2) Necessity of cross-jurisdictional waste treatment

・Massive amounts of disaster-related waste was generated by the Great East Japan Earthquake. Since the devastated areas are short of waste treatment capacity, cross-jurisdictional approaches that make use of facilities outside these areas are needed as well.

・Cross-jurisdictional waste treatment should be promoted because it can be more cost-efficient and creates an additional treatment option.

・The central government should provide information on treatment facilities operated by municipalities or private businesses outside the prefecture. Based on this information, prefectures/municipalities should promote cross-jurisdictional treatment.

・When constructing incinerators and related facilities, municipal governments should consider the establishment of a joint waste treatment structure with neighboring municipalities.

(3) Waste type-specific treatment methods

(i) Combustible waste

・Extensive measures should be taken to prevent fire and manage hygiene at temporary storage sites.

・After being shredded, combustible waste should be effectively used for such purposes as cement calcination and waste power generation to the greatest extent possible.

(ii) Waste wood

・It is expected that waste wood will be mainly used for making wood boards and as fuel for boilers and power generation.

・Prior arrangements should be made with parties accepting waste wood materials with regard to the conditions of acceptable wood, including shape and the level of salt and other impurities contained. (Chipping all the waste wood before its use is determined will make it difficult to find companies that accept the chips.)

・A potential approach is to remove salt by exposing waste wood to rain and use it on demand. In this case, waste wood must be stored without being processed to chips in order to prevent decomposition and fire.

・Another potential approach is to transport waste wood to accepting parties outside the prefecture by boat or by rail so that its salt content and impurities will be removed while being stored there.

・Items that are visually identified as CCA (chromed copper arsenate) treated wood should be incinerated at waste treatment facilities.

(iii) Noncombustible waste

・Noncombustible waste mixed with combustible waste or scrap metal should be subjected to a process to separate it from
combustible waste or scrap metal (e.g., screening with a trommel [a cylinder-shape revolving screen] or a vibrating screen, float and sink separation, magnetic separation), before being disposed of in landfills.

(iv) Scrap metal

・Scrap metal should principally be recycled. For ease of recycling, ferrous metals should be separated from non-ferrous metals (e.g. copper) to the extent possible according to the expected uses at accepting parties.

(v) Waste concrete

・Waste concrete should preferably be used as materials for reconstruction in devastated areas. This is also effective in
reducing the amount of final disposal.

・Waste concrete materials should be separated into asphalt, concrete, stone and other materials according to the uses after recycling.

・Prior arrangements should be made with parties accepting waste concrete with regard to the conditions of acceptable materials, including shape and accretions, in order to determine necessary shredding and grain-size adjustment processes. (Shredding and grain-size adjustment before the uses are determined will make it difficult to find companies that accept the recycled materials.)

・To foster recycling as construction materials, coordination between environmental departments and civil engineering departments and the effective use of private-sector knowledge is indispensable.

(vi) Home appliances and automobiles

・Home appliances regulated under the Designated Home Appliances Recycling Act (televisions, air conditioners, washing
machines/clothes dryers and refrigerators) should be separated to the extent possible. Based on the degree of damage and corrosion, items that can be recycled (items from which useful resources can probably be recovered) should be recycled in accordance with the Act.

・Vehicles should be delivered to collection companies for recycling pursuant to the End-of-Life Vehicle Recycling Law.

(vii) Ships

・Ships should be dismantle after removing fuel and batteries. After dismantling, scrap metal should be recycled. Waste plastic and waste wood should be incinerated in a manner that involves effective use, such as waste power generation, to the extent possible.

・Asbestos-containing parts should be disposed of following the procedure specified for asbestos-containing wastes.

(viii) Hazardous wastes, PCB wastes, asbestos-containing wastes, etc.

・These should be separated from other wastes, treated as hazardous materials or specially controlled wastes and disposed of according to their properties.

(ix) Tsunami sediments

The following treatment methods should be considered according to the properties of the sediments.

・Materials containing toxic substances (e.g., heavy metals), perishable combustible materials and oil-containing materials These should be used as raw materials of cement or be subjected to incineration or landfills at final disposal sites.

・Other materials (those similar to water-bottom sands in properties) After the removal of foreign matter by screening with a trommel (a cylinder-shape revolving screen) or a vibrating screen, these sediments should be used as backfill materials in ground subsidence, recycled into civil engineering materials, or put into the ocean *.

* Tsunami sediments may be put into the ocean under the Marine Pollution and Disaster Prevention Law by permission of the Minister of the Environment, only if they are, just like water-bottom sands for which ocean dumping is allowed, unable to be disposed of on land, do satisfy the specified criteria and will not exert a significant effect on the marine environment.

(x) Waste at post-fire sites

・At post-fire sites, ash should be gathered separately from scrap metals and waste concrete.

・Ash, along with tsunami sediments mixed with ash, should be molten or be disposed of in landfills at final disposal sites as suitable for their dioxin levels.

5. Schedule
In consideration of regional characteristics of the wastes involved and treatment efficiency, each type of disaster-related wastes should be disposed of as shown in Appendix 2 principally within the time frames defined below. The time frames should be redefined by individual municipal governments to optimize them to regional conditions, such as restrictions on the collection volume due to the limited space for temporary storage and the possibility to cause traffic congestion.

(1) Relocation of wastes to temporary storage sites
- Disaster-related wastes that can harm the living environment (e.g., waste remaining close to where people are living) should principally be moved to temporary storage sites by around the end of August 2011.

- Other wastes should be moved by around the end of March 2012

(2) Intermediate treatment and final disposal.
- Perishable waste should be disposed of promptly.

- The appropriate time frame should be set for waste wood and waste concrete that will be recycled, in light of demand for recycled materials and within a period that will not cause degradation or decomposition.

- Other waste should be disposed of by the end of March 2014.

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